As a second figure, leave the target properties (t_2 =). The monist for (t_1) counted from (u_1) (the substance monist, e.g. the materialist) could always be a pluralist for (t_2), counted from (u_1) (for properties counted by the highest type). For example, it could claim that there are two highest types of property, physical and mental, contained in one and the same type of substance (dualism of property). Or it could be nihilistic for (t_2) counted by (u_1) by being an eliminative nominalist on properties and thus rejecting the target. (These examples show the need to relativize monism to a goal.) A seventh argument to consider – drawn from Schaffer 2013 – is the argument of nomic integrity. This argument asserts that the world is a single integrated causal system, and uses this observation to argue for priority monism as follows: Obviously, there is much more to be said, but overall, it is perhaps fair to conclude that priority monism deserves serious consideration, of the kind it is now beginning to receive. There do not seem to be any devastating arguments against priority monism. At least, none of the arguments against priority monism discussed here seem to be decisive in any way. This may surprise those who grew up with the idea that monism can only be an obscure or ridiculous idea. Moreover, there may even be good arguments in favor of priority monism. At the very least, the arguments discussed here in favor of priority monism seem to have some potential for later cultivation.

This site has been fallow for nearly a hundred years. Britannica English: Translation of Monism for Arabic Speakers Here, `(C)` further refers to the property of being a concrete object (according to the formulation of existential monism: §2), and `(P)` to the relation of priority. This defines the predicate `(B)` used in the above formulations of priority monism, pluralism and nihilism. Object fundamentalism can then be defined as follows: the priority monist should ideally respond by giving a successful definition of the intrinsic that is compatible with his point of view. [59] But this is perhaps too much to ask: no one seems to have a completely successful definition of the intrinsic. Perhaps the term – or a related term such as duplication – should end up being considered primitive. [60] In the Madhyamaka school of Mahayana Buddhism, the ultimate nature of the world is described as śūnyatā or „emptiness,“ which is inseparable from sensory objects or anything else. This may seem like a monistic position, but Madhyamaka views—including variations such as Rangtong and Shentong—will refrain from asserting an ultimately existing entity. Instead, they deconstruct any detailed or conceptual claims about ultimate existence as absurd consequences. The view of Yogacara, a minority school found today only among the Mahayana, also rejects monism. Christians claim that God created the universe ex nihilo and not from His own substance, so that the Creator is not to be confused with creation, but transcends it.

There is a movement of „Christian panentheism.“ [83] Even more immanent concepts and theologies must be defined together with God`s omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience, based on God`s desire for intimate contact with his own creation (cf. Acts 17:27). Another use of the term „monism“ is in Christian anthropology to refer to the innate nature of humanity as holistic, as opposed to bipartite and tripartite views. There is a lot of monism. What they have in common is that they attribute unity. Where they differ is what they attribute to unity (purpose) and how they matter (unity). Strictly speaking, there is only monism relating to a goal and a unity, where monism relative to goal (t), counted by unit (u) is the view that (t) counted from (u) is one. Monism is a philosophical position that holds that the diversity of existing things can be explained in terms of reality or single substance. The broad definition is that all things in existence go back to a source that is different from them. The common and limited definition also implies a unit of substance and essence. Monism is opposed by metaphysical dualism and metaphysical pluralism. The term monism comes from Western philosophy, but has also been applied to religions.

Under a certain natural image of fundamental objects, priority monism and priority pluralism are exhaustive and exclusive teachings. The image is that the basic objects tile the cosmos, in the sense that they cover every part of reality without overlapping. More precisely, the restriction of tiles (cf. Schaffer 2010a: §1.3) can be considered as the combination of two conditions: The absence of gaps also makes priority monism equivalent to priority (cosmic) monism. Because if a single concretum is basic, and it must be added to the cosmos, then it must be the cosmos. Similarly, „no overlap“ makes priority pluralism synonymous with priority pluralism (partially). Because if many concreta are basic, then the cosmos cannot belong to the basic concretes, otherwise it overlaps with the others. Monism attributes unity or unity (Greek: μόνος) to a concept, for example existence. Different types of monism can be distinguished: in my opinion, this antithesis of monism and dualism is the most important in the entire history of philosophy. Most of these five monisms are independent, although there are the following logical relationships.

Pluralism on the number of base tokens for a specific category includes pluralism on the respective number of tokens. In the other direction, monism and nihilism on the number of tokens for a specific category imply a corresponding monism or nihilism on the respective number of base tokens. In addition, nihilism about the highest number of types for each concrete category implies nihilism about the number of tokens (and thus the number of base tokens) for that category. The guiding idea here is to use 36, 38 and 39 to show that monism can be wrong by finding a whole whose parts are in front of it, and then cutting off the rest to leave a world whose parts remain before it. The absence of gaps and overlaps leads to further equivalences. On the monistic side, the two conjunctions of priority (cosmic) monism – (exists!xBx) and (Bu) – are mutually dependent. And also on the pluralist side, the two conjunctions of priority pluralism (partially) – (exists xexists y(Bx amp By amp xne y)) and ({sim}Bu) – are reciprocal. This means that, given the restriction of tiles, the numerical thesis that the number of basic concretes is one turns out to be equivalent to the holistic thesis that the base concrete is mereologically maximum.

The main options for the priority monist seem to be to deny the modalized version of 28 (Schaffer 2013: 84) and thus to claim that priority monism also applies in island universes; or deny the last premise that if priority monism is true, it is necessarily true, and instead assert that the issue is contingent (Siegel 2016). But whichever option the priority monist chooses, it is difficult to see how an argument based on the claim that it is necessary for fundamental objects to evolve through fundamental laws could ultimately refute priority monism, given 29`s assertion that the cosmos is the only one that actually evolves through fundamental laws.